Amina worked happily in a respected logistics firm picturesquely situated along the Kilifi shoreline. She aptly guided her team who in term learned to respect her steady consistent reliable temperament.
She exceled at managing freight volumes across several counties and ensured that vessels docked and departed without disruption even when unpredictable weather altered the complicated cargo schedules.
How did Amina create such unity among her supervisors?
She communicated clearly while resolving disputes fairly without favouritism. Her staff trusted her, but her board just never bought in. It carried long standing divisions within itself that sadly influenced down on every major leadership decision inside the company.
Her board suffered from two rival opposing camps that each viewed the other with suspicion. Inasmuch, they guarded their influence which made the company function like an inefficient battleground.
The factions pressured the firm’s directors to choose a board chair from within their ranks even though neither group commanded enough strength to impose its will in totality with a final decision.
The deadlock continued for months, which triggered uncertainty that hurt operations and planning. Amina watched confusion simmer up on her team as managers wondered when united board leadership would reemerge above them. She then lost a key manager who quit due to the uncertainty.
Researchers Robert Langan, Ryan Krause, and Markus Menz in their brand new critically acclaimed study explain how divided boards often appoint a newcomer board chair when no subgroup faction holds enough dominance and when demographic faultlines deepen the mistrust felt among the existing directors.
The research maps how differences in age, gender, and ethnicity create natural unfortunate clusters inside boards. Rival clusters block each other from elevating an internal favourite to board chair roles.
Directors then accept a newcomer more readily than a rival chairperson because that individual carries no loyalty to either side and enables progress without rewarding one camp over the other.
The research findings capture similar tension to what Amina observes in her own Kilifi firm whereby the board members focus on factional control instead of strategic oversight for the firm at large.
The study further argues that CEO power shapes the outcome of these stalemates because a strong CEO can force boards to accept the leader that the CEO actually prefers. Meanwhile, weaker CEOs lack robust influence and instead watch the factions fight it out without resolution until exhaustion pushes them toward an uncomfortable compromise.
Sadly, a firm’s performance also shapes behaviour because high performance encourages camps to fight harder for influence while low performance in a company reduced the board factions’ appetites for control due to the fear of being to blame for failure. The dynamics reveal how board politics guide leadership choices far more than firm-specific knowledge alone.
Managers across Kenya often encounter similar pressures when factions that govern their institutions through old alliances and identity-based clusters gang up.
Leaders who seek unity must guide governance organs toward decisions that promote fairness instead of victory at all costs. They must trade lasting stability over short-term factional gain, which proves easier said than done.
The research arms managers with evidence that clarifies why impasses form and how newcomer leadership can diffuse difficult institutional tensions. Executives who recognise the value of such compromise introduce reforms can strengthen accountability and cooperation.
